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ABSTRACT
This research describes our survey of data remaining on computer hard disks sold on the second
hand market in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This is a repetition of the first survey conducted
in 2012 (Jones, Martin, & Alzaabi, 2012). Similar studies have been carried over the last ten years in
the United Kingdom, Australia, USA, Germany and France: (Jones, Mee, Meyler, & Gooch, 2005),
(Jones, Valli, Sutherland, & Thomas, 2006), (Jones, Valli, Dardick, & Sutherland, 2008), (Jones,
Valli, Dardick, & Sutherland, 2009). This research was undertaken to gain insight into the volumes
of data found on second-hand disks purchased in the UAE, as well as any changes that have occurred
since the previous survey. We will also compare these results to those produced in other regions of
the world to gain an understanding of the relative level of the problem of residual data in the UAE.
The core methodology of the research adopted for this study was the same as has been used for
the other global studies. The methodology included the acquisition of a number of second hand
computer disks from a range of sources and their subsequent analysis. The goal of the analysis was
to determine whether any data could be recovered from the disk and if so, whether the data that
it contained could be used to determine the previous owner or user. If information was found on
the disks and the previous user or owner could be identified, the research examined whether the
information was of a sensitive nature or in a sufficient volume to represent a risk.
Keywords: Computer forensics, disk analysis, data recovery, data disposal, data destruction, data
leakage, privacy.
1. INTRODUCTION
As technology advances, computers occupy an
ever-more important role in our lives. We rely
on them for everything, including communica-
tion, education, transport, finance, as well as
entertainment. As their importance increases,
so does the amount of data about us that we
allow them to store. Mobile and personal de-
vices, with their wide array of sensors to gather
data, as well as close ties to social networks, fur-
ther exacerbate the problem. While new features
and improved convenience are often at forefront
of the consumer’s mind, security often takes a
back seat (although awareness of security issues
is slowly improving). The lack of caution is es-
pecially a problem when it comes to disposing
of devices. The typical lifespan of computing
devices is shrinking, and proper sanitization of
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the confidential data they contain is not always
performed before disposal. The potential im-
pact of such lapses could vary from minor embar-
rassment of individuals to organizations suffering
major data breaches. The information recovered
in (Jones et al., 2012) ranged from holiday pho-
tos to confidential interviews collected as part of
a University study.
The research question of this survey is: what
are the amounts and types of information that
remain on computer disks that have been offered
for sale on the second hand market in the UAE.
This is the second such survey to be conducted
in this region (Jones et al., 2012). We are repeat-
ing the survey to determine what, if any, changes
have occurred in the practices of data sanitiza-
tion and disposal in the interim.
The overall finding of our survey was that
there is still a dangerously high amount of sensi-
tive data that remains on second-hand disks sold
in the UAE. The research revealed that the num-
ber of disks that contain personally identifiable
information has greatly increased, far above the
global figure. The number of disks containing
information related to organizations has also in-
creased compared to the previous survey, but is
still below the global figure.
The aim of the research was to determine
whether any data remained on second hand com-
puter disks and if it did, the potential sensitivity
of the information to the previous owner. The
research was conducted under the same condi-
tions that had been used during previous second
hand disk and hand-held mobile devices stud-
ies, carried out by the University of Glamorgan,
Edith Cowan University, Longwood University,
and British Telecommunication: (Jones et al.,
2005), (Jones et al., 2006), (Jones, Valli, Dard-
ick, & Sutherland, 2008), (Jones, Valli, Dardick,
& Sutherland, 2009). The tools used were com-
mon and easily available, and equated to the un-
delete and unformat commands in older versions
of Windows (Fisher, 2016) and a hexadecimal
editor. We have made a new addition to this
survey: all files recovered were also scanned for
malware. The results of the research are that a
number of observations can be made with regard
to the level and type of information remaining
on second hand computer disks and a number
of conclusions and recommendations have been
made on ways to improve the situation with re-
gard to data remaining on second hand computer
disks.
In Section 2 we will give an overview of simi-
lar studies. We describe the methodology of our
survey in Section 3. Section 4 consists of the re-
sults of the survey, first presented on their own,
then compared to the related works. Finally,
we give our conclusions and recommendations in
Sections 5 and 6 respectively.
2. RELATED WORKS
The first survey of data remaining on second-
hard hard disks was performed in (Jones et al.,
2005). This set out the general methodology
that later surveys followed (including this one).
Disks were purchased in small batches from dif-
ferent sources around the UK (92 in total). The
disks were imaged and searched for identifying
information. This initial survey revealed that
sensitive data remaining on disks appeared to
be widespread. 13% were fault, and 16% of the
remaining were wiped. Of the remaining disks,
70% had commercial data and 59% had individ-
ual data present.
In subsequent years, the survey was repeated,
both to determine what, if any, changes occurred
in the practice of data sanitization before re-
sale, and to also include data from other loca-
tions. In (Jones et al., 2006) and (Jones, Valli,
& G. S. Dardick, 2008), the survey included
disks from the UK, Australia, North America,
and Germany. France was added to the list of
countries in (Jones, Valli, Dardick, & Suther-
land, 2008) and (Jones, Valli, Dardick, & Suther-
land, 2009). The observed trend shows a slow
but steady decline in the number of disks with
identifiable data present, but still remaining at a
level to raise concern.
The first survey of second hand disks in the
UAE was conducted in (Jones et al., 2012). The
fraction of devices with individual or organisa-
tional data was less than the global rates. Spe-
cific results will be presented in comparison to
this present survey in Section 4.2.
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Other surveys have been conducted on other
storage media. Instead of hard drives, USB
drives were examined in (Jones, Valli, & Dabibi,
2009). Mobile phones were purchased and stud-
ied in (Valli & Jones, 2008). Both surveys re-
vealed similar lapses in proper sanitization of
devices before re-sale, but the specific types of
personal data varied.
The subject of the ethics of research involv-
ing residual data was discussed in (Glisson,
Storer, Blyth, Grispos, & Campbell, 2016). As
well as reviewing the risks and privacy concerns
of past studies, several recommendations were
made: Identifying clear research objectives, suit-
able training for investigators, anonymization of
information disclosed, complete lifecycle security
practices, liaising with relevant ethics commit-
tees, and particular care when data is crossing
national boundaries.
3. RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY
To ensure that the results of the research provide
a realistic and scientifically sound view of the
situation, 40 second hand computer disks were
obtained. All of the computer disks used in the
research were purchased in computer or mobile
phone shops in four of the Emirates (Abu Dhabi,
Dubai, Sharjah, and Fujairah). The computer
disks were purchased discretely, either separately
or in small lots by a number of purchasers. This
procedure was adopted in order to minimise the
possibility of the sellers becoming aware of the
purpose for which the computer disks were being
obtained and to ensure that the actions of one
seller did not have a disproportionate effect on
the results of the study.
The computer disks were supplied “blind” to
the researchers. This means that the researchers
had no indication of the source of the computer
disks that they were analysing. The only identi-
fying mark on the computer disks that were pro-
vided to the researchers was a unique sequential
serial number so that there was no indication of
where or how they had been obtained (other than
specifying the Emirate). The research method-
ology used was the same as that used in the
previous surveys: (Jones et al., 2005), (Jones
et al., 2006), (Jones, Valli, Dardick, & Suther-
land, 2008), (Jones, Valli, Dardick, & Suther-
land, 2009). The steps taken to examine each
disk were as follows:
1. The disk was forensically imaged
2. The image was imported into FTK
3. File carving was performed on the image,
seeking to recover Office documents, image
files, pdf’s, and html files
4. The filesystem was manually examined for
identifiable information, in particular the
commonly used areas
5. Samples of the various filetypes were manu-
ally examined for identifiable information
6. On discovery of any potential identifiable in-
formation, searches were performed to find
the locations of other matches
7. Hashes of all recovered files were uploaded
to Virustotal
The forensic imaging was performed with
readily available software (Raptor 3.0 Live CD1
or AccessData Forensic Tool Kit (FTK) Imager
3.1.0.15142). The analysis was then undertaken
on the forensic images of the computer disks.
There were two main reasons for the adoption of
this time consuming step. The first was to pre-
serve the original media in its original state and
store it in a secure area in case criminal activity
was discovered and there was a requirement to
pass the disks on to law enforcement. By adopt-
ing this procedure, the chain of custody was pre-
served for any investigation by law enforcement.
This allowed the research to be carried out in
a non-intrusive manner that did not affect or
change the original data. The second was that if
any anomalies were detected with the image, it
would be possible to validate the data against a
second image created from the original.
1https://www.forensicsandediscovery.com/Pages/
Raptor.aspx Accessed 10th August 2016
2http://accessdata.com/product-download/
digital-forensics Accessed 10th August 2016
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The tools used in this study to analyse the
images of computer disks were fundamentally
the same as those used in previous disk stud-
ies (although the versions of the tools have
changed). The primary tool used was FTK
4.0.0.35120. The tools performed similar func-
tions to the Windows unformat and undelete
commands. File carving of common file types
was also performed as it is a reliable method for
recovering files from unallocated space (e.g. ei-
ther deleted files or files on a disk that has been
formatted). Where it was necessary to manually
examine information that existed in the unallo-
cated portion of the computer disk, hexadecimal
editors were used. Tools that perform this type
of functionality are free and readily available: ex-
amples include forensic analysis tools such as Au-
topsy3 and the Linux Kali distribution4. Free-
ware Hexadecimal editors include XVI325 and
HxD6. These tools can be used effectively by any-
one with a moderate level of skill investing some
time and effort. I.e. it is reasonable to assume
these actions could be performed by a malicious
actor.
For this year’s survey, we also introduced the
use of malware scans. All executables recovered
from the disks were checked with the VirusTotal
database7. This is intended to give an indication
of the prevalence of malware on devices in the re-
gion, as well as also highlighting the risks posed
by the use of second hand disks. All recovered
executable files from the disks were hashed and
the hashes uploaded to the VirusTotal site using
a script. The hashes are then checked against
a number of anti-malware scans (generally 56 or
57 in our experiments). Since only the hashes
were uploaded, this necessarily means that the
scans were purely signature based, as opposed
to heuristic. In order to reduce the numbers of
3http://www.sleuthkit.org/autopsy/ Accessed 12th
August 2016
4https://www.kali.org/ Accessed 12th August 2016
5http://www.chmaas.handshake.de/delphi/
freeware/xvi32/xvi32.htm Accessed 12th August
2016
6https://mh-nexus.de/en/hxd/ Accessed 12th Au-
gust 2016
7https://www.virustotal.com/ Accessed 15th Au-
gust 2016
false positives, we only consider a file to be mal-
ware if three or more of the scans flag the file as
malicious.
In order to protect the privacy of the previous
owners of the disks, appropriate measures were
taken. The disks were stored in a physically se-
cure location and all analysis was done on an iso-
lated network. Only those with suitable training
took part in the analysis and no identifying de-
tails have been included in the publication of the
research.
The objectives of the research were the same
as those defined for the previous disk and hand
held mobile device studies: firstly to determine
whether the computer disks that were obtained
in the UAE had been effectively cleansed of data
or whether they still contained information that
was either visible or easily recoverable with the
tools identified above. The second objective of
the research was to identify whether there was
information that could be used to identify the
organisation or individual(s) that had used the
computer disks.
4. RESULTS
4.1 2016 Results
The initial results indicate that there was a sig-
nificant amount of information found on com-
puter disks in the UAE compared to the pre-
vious study, considerably more for personal in-
formation. There was also an increase in the
number of disks obtained that contained highly
sensitive/high risk information.
This section details the results for the study
for the 40 computer disks obtained in the UAE:
• 7 disks (17.5%) were damaged and as a re-
sult, unreadable.
• 7 (17.5%) had been effectively cleaned and
contained no recoverable data8
• Of the remaining 26 (65%) disks
– 15 (37.5%) had been deleted or for-
matted, but still contained recoverable
data.
8Either the disk was entirely \x00 bytes or was entirely
random bytes.
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– 11 (27.5%) contained data that could
be easily recovered,
– 9 (22.5%) contained sufficient informa-
tion for the organisation that they had
come from to be identified.
– 20 (50%) contained sufficient informa-
tion for individuals to be identified.
– 17 (42.5%) contained malware.
The results are presented as graphs in Fig-
ure 1. The significance of the first category of the
remaining 26 disks is that the previous owner has
made a naive attempt to sanitize the disk, typ-
ically through formatting and re-installation of
the OS. This is not enough to prevent file carving
of many of the user’s files. The second category,
where data could be easily recovered, suggests
that with more effort expended more files could
be recovered. This is likely the case. Since file
carving does not work with file fragments for ex-
ample, one could use known techniques to try to
find and match fragments. This was not done for
a number of reasons. First, the time involved in
such analysis would greatly reduce the size of the
sample that could be managed, and the larger
the sample size the more reflective the results.
Second, it seems unrealistic for a malicious ac-
tor to go to such lengths unless they knew there
was something of value to be found. Thirdly, our
recommendations at the end of the paper do not
merely have the aim of making the user’s data
“not easy” to recover, but rather impossible to
recover.
4.2 Comparison to Previous Results
In Figure 2 we compare these results with those
of the previous survey for the UAE, as well as
the previous global survey. There is a notice-
able increase in the amount of disks obtained
that stored sensitive data relating to individu-
als. CVs, passport scans, and ID card scans
were obtained from many of the disks. The fact
that such scans are often requested when reg-
istering for services means they are more likely
to be stored and kept by the users, but also in-
creases the potential damage they could do in
terms of fraud. The number of disks storing
sensitive data relating to organizations has only
slightly increased, but is still much lower than
the value from the previous global survey.
Figure 3 shows an assessment of the level of
risk that the data recovered would pose to the in-
dividual or the organisation. Whereas the previ-
ous survey had relatively few disks with medium
and high risk data present, this time it appears
to have significantly increased. This suggests a
worrying trend of the increased use of technol-
ogy for convenience, without a corresponding use
of protection and disposal mechanisms that are
necessary to ensure the security and privacy of
the data. There also seems to be a blurring of the
distinction between devices used for work and for
personal use. We often came across disks that
had both types of use. The question of whether
they were personal devices where the owner often
did their work, or work devices with a significant
amount of personal use was difficult to decide.
As mentioned in Section 3, we included a
malware scan of the disks for the first time in
this survey. Of the 26 disks that had recover-
able data, 65.4% (17/26) were flagged as hav-
ing malware by our VirusTotal scan (meaning
each of those 17 disks had at least one file that
was flagged as malicious by at least three anti-
malware scanners). This is a significant portion
of the sample, and indicates an absence of suit-
able protection mechanisms in the region. It also
suggests a risk to using second hand disks or de-
vices.
Details for the top five are given in Table 1.
The staggering number of malware files on these
disks is surprising. If we take an even more con-
servative approach and only consider a file ma-
licious if 30 or more anti-virus scanners flag it
as malware (over half), then we see the num-
bers are reduced. Dramatically in some cases (L1
and L5), but only slightly in others (L4). This
would seem to confirm that although there may
be some false positives, there are certainly many
cases of malware on the disks. The differences
do suggest a wide variance in performance of the
anti-virus scanners. On their website, they do
disclaim that “VirusTotal is not responsible for
false positives generated by any of the resources
it uses” and that some of the scans are config-
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Figure 1: Summary of results. Note that for all the disks where it was possible to identify the
organization, it was also possible to identify the individual user. Hence to 0% portion of disks where
only the organization was identified.
ured to be more aggressive than the public com-
mercial versions (Unspecified, 2016). This would
increase the chances of false positives.
The previous UAE survey noted the presence
of Passport scans and other identity documents
in many of the disks. This trend has contin-
ued, and even increased. Sensitive documents
are required for many services in the UAE, and
there are few precautions taken to control how
these documents are spread. Other specific in-
stances of valuable data, originating from com-
mercial and private individuals, are detailed be-
low9:
• One disk had Funds Transfer Form (includ-
ing account numbers) for an amount of over
680,000 AED.
• One disk was likely from a bank, and had
records of a number of audits of security
controls at a specific branch. It also had cus-
tomer call sheets, with customers’ account
and mobile numbers. There was even a doc-
ument titled “Security Plan & Security Per-
sonnel Job Descriptions”.
• One disk contained a file named “Job Sites
9All financial transactions and balances are stated in
UAE dirham (AED). At the time of writing, the exchange
rate is 1 AED equals 0.24 Euro or 0.27 USD.
Userids.txt”, which seemed to have login
usernames (and possibly passwords) for var-
ious sites and services. The passwords (if
that was what they were) were not particu-
larly strong.
• One disk was from a jewellery store and has
several invoices for 6 figure sums (in AED).
• One disk was connected to local shipping.
Recovered files included an agreement doc-
ument between a shipping company and
travel center, with signatures and seals, a
crew list of 50 for a vessel with personal de-
tails of each, invoices from the shipping com-
pany, and “Sharjah Port Authority Master’s
Report”. Also of note was a fax to the Se-
curity Office at Ajman Port regarding which
people were allowed to go onboard vessels to
carry out repairs.
• One disk had a comprehensive collection of
financial details of a single individual. Bank
account opening forms, credit card state-
ments (with complete numbers), details of
investments, scanned checks for dividends.
A summary slide listed account numbers,
balances, and PINs. Some statements were
encrypted, but using a password based on
the individual’s date of birth. This date
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Figure 2: Comparison of results from the 2009 global survey, the previous 2012 UAE survey and the
current 2016 survey (figures for data present are percentages of the number of disks that had not
been wiped/faulty)
Figure 3: Assessment of level of Risk of the data recovered
was readily available from other documents
on the disk and the statements were de-
crypted10.
• One disk had several highly sensitive doc-
uments from a company in the Oil & Gas
industry. Files included geological data,
satellite imagery, “Annual Reservoir Perfor-
mance Report January 2006”, map of “Most
Likely Oil-In-Place Potential (Yet to Find)”,
10We also simulated what would have been necessary if
the password policy was known but the user’s birth date
was not. We wrote a simple script to check all dates as
passwords starting at the 1st of January 1900. After 16
minutes the correct password was found.
“Planned Development Wells”, “SCADA
Systems for *Region* Wells”, “Review and
Audit of key technical processes”. Docu-
ments described projects costing tens of mil-
lions of dollars. A “Longer Term View”
forecast was present with projections up to
2034.
Technology, for the most part, has kept pace
with the need to protect information to an ap-
propriate level while it is in use and to destroy
it effectively when it is no longer required. The
observed failures from commercial organisations
seem to be a result of a lack of corporate poli-
cies and procedures for the protection and sub-
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Disk Label Executable
files
Flagged by
3+
scanners
Flagged by
30+ scanners
Disk L1 35,208 320 14
Disk L2 9,248 179 60
Disk L3 52,758 158 16
Disk L4 49,256 113 103
Disk L5 15,834 42 1
Table 1: Top 5 disks based on numbers of files flagged as malicious by at least 3 anti-virus scans in
VirusTotal. Numbers of files flagged by at least 30 anti-virus scans also shown
sequent disposal of obsolete computer disks or
a failure to effectively implement these policies
where they do exist. For private users, the cause
is more likely to be a lack of awareness of the
risk arising from failing to erase such informa-
tion. Equally, they may not be aware of the
availability of the tools and techniques to ensure
that data is properly erased when it is no longer
required.
The subject of the effective erasure of data
was first highlighted in a 1996 conference pa-
per (Gutmann, 1996) that reported research
on the secure deletion of data. A second pa-
per (Gutmann, 2001) examined Data Rema-
nence in Semiconductor Devices and a further
paper (Garfinkel & Shelat, 2003) looked at the
measures that could be taken to “sanitize” com-
puter disks. In the period since the issue was
first raised, there has been an ongoing series of
news reports on high profile cases where personal
or organisational information has been found in
the public domain. There has also been increas-
ing publicity and awareness of the issue of iden-
tity theft and the guidance on how to protect
both personal and organisational information.
There are now a good range of tools that can
be used to effectively erase data from computer
disks. However, there appears to be an ongo-
ing issue with making the users aware of the
problem. With the ever increasing levels of theft
of both corporate and personal information that
are being reported ((Arthur, 2014), (Nakashima,
2015), (Perlroth, 2015), (Harding, 2016)) and the
availability of suitable tools to erase data, it is
difficult to explain the amount of information
that has been found in this survey. It is clear
that further investigation needs to be carried out
to understand the underlying cause.
For those computer disks that were for per-
sonal use, the results indicate that there is an
issue with awareness and education of the users
as to what information is sensitive and how they
can ensure that it is destroyed. For the most
part the disks are used to store music, video,
photographs and other, often small items of in-
formation that the user will not necessarily con-
sider to be significant. The items of information
that were consistently found on the disks that
are considered to be of high risk were copies of
passports, visas and bank account details.
For the disks that contained commercial in-
formation, there was a range of information on
the companies’ operations and customers. This
would be embarrassing and potentially damag-
ing to the business if the knowledge that they
had released it into the public domain became
known.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The issue of the use and subsequent disposal
of computer hard disks is a significant problem,
and is bound to grow as such threats as identity
theft and data disclosures becomes more preva-
lent. The results of the survey in the UAE show
that the volume of relevant information recov-
ered has grown since the previous survey, and
also that there is even more extremely sensitive
information that is not being properly disposed.
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The number of disks wiped has even slightly re-
duced. To compound the matter, because of lo-
cal customs and requirements, where personal in-
formation was recovered it was potentially highly
damaging.
Comparing these results to surveys done in
other regions shows two significant departures.
The disks in the UAE had significantly greater
numbers of disks with individual data, but sig-
nificantly fewer disks with organizational data.
The reasons behind the possible differences are
hard to precisely determine. It may be that “re-
cycling” of devices is more common a practice
among individuals in the UAE than with orga-
nizations. If users were aware of, and were fol-
lowing, proper data sanitization procedures, we
would have expected to see a greater number of
wiped disks. The numbers for this survey were
actually less than both the previous UAE survey
and those from other regions.
A number of the disks examined were found to
contain sensitive corporate or personal informa-
tion and the consequence of failing to remove or
erase this data is that it continues to be available
to anyone that might seek to exploit it. There
is ongoing clear requirement that staff within
organisations be given the appropriate aware-
ness, education and training programmes. They
need to be able to ensure that computer disks
and other media is properly managed and that
the data that they contain is protected properly
while in use and then erased before the disks are
disposed of. For the disks from personal comput-
ers, there is a need for the owner to be educated
with regard to the potential risks caused by the
information and the steps that they can take to
effectively erase the data when they dispose of
the computer.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS
There are a number of measures that can be
taken by both individuals and organisations to
reduce the volume of sensitive information that
is inadvertently given away when they dispose of
computer disks. These include:
1. Education - A public awareness campaign
by Government, the media, commerce
and/or academia.
2. Risk Assessment The organisation carries
out risk assessments to determine sensitivity
of the information that may be stored on the
computer disks that are being disposed of.
3. Roles and Responsibilities The assigning
of the roles and responsibilities to those in-
dividuals responsible for issuing, managing
and disposing of computer disks.
4. Best Practices - The introduction of pro-
cedures within organisations to ensure that
computer disks are disposed of in an appro-
priate manner.
5. Physical Destruction - Where appropriate,
the physical destruction of the computer
disks.
6. Encryption - The encryption of the com-
puter disks to ensure that information can-
not be easily recovered in the event of their
loss, theft or disposal.
7. Data Erasure Provide access to the tools
and facilities to enable individuals to ef-
fectively remove the information from their
computer disks.
8. Regulation - Require all manufacturers to
include built-in means for the total erasure
of all data within devices.
These simple measures could play a significant
part in reducing the risks posed by the inade-
quate disposal of devices.
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